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Abstract
Among the image forensic issues investigated in the last
few years, great attention has been devoted to blind camera
model attribution. This refers to the problem of detecting
which camera model has been used to acquire an image
by only exploiting pixel information. Solving this problem
has great impact on image integrity assessment as well as
on authenticity verification. Recent advancements that use
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) in the media foren-
sic field have enabled camera model attribution methods to
work well even on small image patches. These improve-
ments are also important for determining forgery localiza-
tion. Some patches of an image may not contain enough
information related to the camera model (e.g., saturated
patches). In this paper, we propose a CNN-based solution to
estimate the camera model attribution reliability of a given
image patch. We show that we can estimate a reliability-
map indicating which portions of the image contain reli-
able camera traces. Testing using a well known dataset
confirms that by using this information, it is possible to in-
crease small patch camera model attribution accuracy by
more than 8% on a single patch.
1. Introduction
Due to the widespread availability of inexpensive image
capturing devices (e.g., cameras and smartphones) and user-
friendly editing software (e.g., GIMP and Adobe Photo-
Shop), image manipulation is very easy. For this reason, the
multimedia forensic community has developed techniques
for image authenticity detection and integrity assessment
[1, 2, 3].
Among the problems considered in the forensic litera-
ture, one important problem is camera model attribution,
which consists in estimating the camera model used to ac-
quire an image [4]. This proves useful when a forensic an-
Figure 1. Reliability map representation for an example image
taken with a given camera. In this case, patches belonging to the
sky (green box) are more likely to provide accurate camera model
attribution than patches containing textures (red box).
alyst needs to link an image under investigation to a user
[5], or to detect possible image manipulations [6, 7] (e.g.,
splicing of pictures from different cameras).
Linking an image to a camera can in principle be triv-
ially done exploiting image header information (e.g., EXIF
data). It is also true that image headers are not reliable (e.g.,
anyone can tamper with them) or not always available (e.g.,
decoded images and screen captures). Therefore, the need
for a series of blind methodologies has led to the develop-
ment of pixel-based only information extraction methods.
These methods leverage the fact that image acquisition
pipeline is slightly different for each camera model and
manufacturer (e.g., different sensors and color equalization
techniques). Therefore, each image contains characteristic
“fingerprints” that enable one to understand which pipeline
has been used and hence the camera model. Among these
techniques, exploiting photo sensor non uniformity (PRNU)
is particularly robust and enables camera instance identifi-
cation [8, 9]. Other methods exploit traces left by color filter
array (CFA) interpolation [10, 11, 12], camera lenses [13],
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histogram equalization [14] or noise [15]. Alternatively,
a series of methods extracting statistical features from the
pixel-domain and exploiting supervised machine-learning
classifier have also been proposed [16, 17, 18].
Due to the advancements brought by deep learning tech-
niques in the last few years, the forensic community is also
exploring convolutional neural networks (CNNs) for cam-
era model identification [19]. Interestingly, the approach
in [20] has shown the possibility of accurately estimating
the camera model used to acquire an image by analyzing
a small portion of the image (i.e., a 64 × 64 color image
patch). This has lead to the development of forgery local-
ization techniques [21].
In this paper we propose a CNN-based method for es-
timating patch reliability for camera model attribution. As
explained in [22], not all image patches contain enough dis-
criminative information to estimate the camera model (e.g.,
saturated areas and too dark regions). Leveraging the net-
work proposed in [20], we show how it is possible to de-
termine whether an image patch contains reliable camera
model traces for camera model attribution. Using this tech-
nique, we build a reliability map, which indicates the like-
lihood of each image region to be possibly used for camera
model attribution, as shown in Figure 1. This map can be
used to select only reliable patches for camera model attri-
bution. Additionally, it can also be used to drive tampering
localization methods [21] by providing valuable informa-
tion on which patches should be considered to be unreliable.
The proposed method leverages CNN feature learning
capabilities and transfer learning training strategies. Specif-
ically, we make use of a CNN composed by the architec-
ture proposed in [20] as feature extractor, followed by a se-
ries of fully connected layers for patch reliability estima-
tion. Transfer learning enables to preserve part of the CNN
weights of [20], and train the whole architecture end-to-end
with a reduced number of image patches. Our strategy is
validated on the Dresden Image Database [23]. We first val-
idate the proposed architecture and training strategy. Then,
we compare the proposed solution against a set of base-
line methodologies based on classic supervised machine-
learning techniques. Finally, we show how it is possible to
increase camera model attribution accuracy by more than
8% with respect to [20] using the proposed method.
2. Problem Statement and Related Work
In this section we introduce the problem formulation
with the notation used throughout the paper. We then pro-
vide the reader a brief overview about CNNs and their use
in multimedia forensics.
2.1. Problem Formulation
Let us consider a color image I acquired with camera
model l belonging to a set of known camera models L. In
this paper, we consider the patch-based closed-set camera
model attribution problem as presented in [20]. Given an
image I, this means
• Select a subset of K color patches Pk, k ∈ [1,K].
• Obtain an estimate lˆk = C(Pk) of the camera model
associated with each patch through a camera attribu-
tion function C.
• Optionally obtain final camera model estimate lˆ
through majority voting over lˆk, k ∈ [1,K].
Our goal is to detect whether a patch Pk is a good can-
didate for camera model attribution estimation. To this pur-
pose, we propose a CNN architecture that learns a function
G expressing the likelihood of a patchPk to provide correct
camera model identification, i.e., gk = G(Pk). High val-
ues of gk indicate high probability of patch Pk to provide
correct camera information. Conversely, low gk values are
attributed to patches Pk that cannot be correctly classified.
Pixel-wise likelihood is then represented by means of a re-
liability map M, showing which portion of an image is a
good candidate to estimate image camera model, as shown
in Figure 1.
2.2. Convolutional Neural Networks in Multimedia
Forensics
In this section, we present a brief overview of the foun-
dations of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) that are
needed to follow the paper. For a thorough review on CNNs,
we refer the readers of this paper to Chapter 9 of [24].
Deep learning and in particular CNNs have shown very
good performance in several computer vision applications
such as visual object recognition, object detection and many
other domains such as drug discovery and genomics [25].
Inspired by how the human vision works, the layers of a
convolutional network have neurons arranged in three di-
mensions, so each layer has a width height, and depth. The
neurons in a convolutional layer are only connected to a
small, local region of the preceding layer, so we avoid wast-
ing resources as it is common in fully-connected neurons.
The nodes of the network are organized in multiple stacked
layers, each performing a simple operation on the input.
The set of operations in a CNN typically comprises con-
volution, intensity normalization, non-linear activation and
thresholding, and local pooling. By minimizing a cost func-
tion at the output of the last layer, the weights of the network
are tuned so that they are able to capture patterns in the input
data and extract distinctive features. CNNs enable learning
data-driven, highly representative, layered hierarchical im-
age features from sufficient training data
To better understand the role of each layer, we describe
the most common building blocks in a CNN:
Figure 2. Block diagram of the proposed approach. Image I is split into patches. Each patch Pk, k ∈ [0,K] is processed by the proposed
CNN (composed by Mcam and Mip) to obtain a reliability score gk and a camera model estimate lˆk. The reliability map is determined
from all gk, k ∈ [0,K] values, and the overall picture camera model estimate lˆ can be computed.
• Convolution: each convolution layer is a filterbank,
whose filters impulse response h are learned through
training. Given an input signal x, the output of each
filter is y = x ∗ h, i.e., the valid part of the linear
convolution. Convolution is typically done on 3D rep-
resentations consisting of the spatial coordinates (x, y)
and the number of feature maps p (e.g., p = 3 for an
RGB input).
• Max pooling: returns the maximum value of the in-
put x evaluated across small windows (typically of 3x3
pixels).
• ReLU: Rectified Linear Units use the rectification
function y = max(0, x) to the input x, thus clipping
negative values to zero.
• Inner Product: indicates that the input of each neuron
of the next layer is a linear combination of all the out-
puts of the previous layer. Combination weights are
estimated during training.
• SoftMax: maps the input into compositional data (i.e.,
each value is in the range [0, 1], and they all sum up
to one). This is particularly useful at the end of the
network in order to interpret its outputs as probability
values.
There has been a growing interest in using convolutional
neural networks in the fields of image forensics and ste-
ganalysis [26, 27]. These papers mainly focus on architec-
tural design of CNNs where a single CNN model is trained
and then tested in experiments. Data-driven models have
recently proved valuable for other multimedia forensic ap-
plications as well [28, 29]. Moreover, initial exploratory
solutions targeting camera model identification [30, 20, 21]
show that it is possible to use CNNs to learn discriminant
features directly from the observed known images, rather
than having to use hand-crafted features. As a matter of
fact, the use of CNNs also makes it possible to capture char-
acteristic traces left by non-linear and hard to model opera-
tions present in the image acquisition pipeline of capturing
devices.
In this paper, we employ CNNs as base learners and test
several different training strategies and network topologies.
In our study, at first, a recently proposed CNN architec-
ture is adopted as a feature extractor, trained on a random
subsample of the training dataset. An intermediate feature
representation is then extracted from the original data and
pooled together to form new features ready for the second
level of classification. Results have indicated that learning
from intermediate representation in CNNs instead of output
probabilities, and then jointly retraining the final architec-
ture, leads to performance improvement.
3. Patch Reliability Estimation Method
In this section we provide details of our method for patch
reliability estimation and camera attribution. The proposed
pipeline is composed by the following steps (see Figure 2):
1. The image under analysis is split into patches
2. A CNN is used to estimate patch reliability likelihood
3. From the same CNN we estimate a camera model for
each patch
4. A reliability mask is constructed and camera attribu-
tion of the whole image is performed
Below is a detailed explanation of each step.
3.1. Patch Extraction
The proposed method works by analyzing image
patches. The first step is to split the color image I into a set
of K patchesPk, k ∈ [0,K]. Each patch has 64× 64 pixel
resolution. The patch extraction stride can range from 1 to
64 per dimension, depending on the amount of desired over-
lap. This can be chosen to balance the trade-off between
mask resolution reliability and computational burden.
3.2. Patch Camera Reliability
Each patch Pk is input into the CNNM shown in Fig-
ure 3, which can be logically split into two parts (Mcam and
Figure 3. Representation of the proposed CNN architecture M working on image patches. The first part (Mcam) computes a |L|-element
feature vector used for camera attribution. The second part (Mip) is used to derive the camera model attribution reliability.
Mip) connected through a ReLU activation layer. Our pro-
posed CNN learns a patch reliability function G and returns
the patch reliability gk = G(Pk).
The first part (i.e., Mcam) is the CNN presented in [20]
without last layer’s activation. The rationale behind this
choice is that this network is already known to be able to
extract characteristic camera information. Therefore, we
can mainly think of this portion of the proposed CNN as
the feature extractor, turning a patch Pk into a feature vec-
tor in R|L|, where |L| is the number of considered camera
models. Formally,Mcam is composed by:
• conv1: convolutional layer with 32 filters of size 4 ×
4× 3 and stride 1.
• conv2: convolutional layer with 48 filters of size 5 ×
5× 32 and stride 1.
• conv3: convolutional layer with 64 filters of size 5 ×
5× 48 and stride 1.
• conv4: convolutional layer with 128 filters of size 5×
5 × 64 and stride 1, which outputs a vector with 128
elements.
• ip1: inner product layer with 128 output neurons fol-
lowed by a ReLU layer to produce a 128 dimensional
feature vector.
• ip2: final 128× |L| inner product layer.
The first three convolutional layers are followed by max-
pooling layers with 2 × 2 kernels and 2 × 2 stride. This
network contains 360 462 trainable parameters.
The second part of our architecture (i.e., Mip) is com-
posed by a series of inner product layers followed by ReLU
activations. This part of the proposed CNN can be consid-
ered as a two-class classifier trying to distinguish between
patches that can be correctly classified, and patches that
cannot correctly be attributed to their camera model. As
shall be clear in Section 4, we tested different possibleMip
architecture candidates, to decide upon the following struc-
ture (denoted later on asM4ip due to the 4 layers that char-
acterize it):
• ip3: inner product layer with 64 output neurons fol-
lowed by ReLU
• ip4: inner product layer with 32 output neurons fol-
lowed by ReLU
• ip5: inner product layer with 128 output neurons fol-
lowed by ReLU
• ip6 inner product layer with 2 output neurons followed
by softmax normalization
The first element of the softmax output vector can be con-
sidered the likelihood of a patch to be correctly classified.
Therefore, we consider this value as gk, and the transfer
function learned by the wholeM network as G.
3.3. Patch Camera Attribution
In order to detect the camera model from each patchPk,
we exploit the architectureMcam. As explained in [20], this
CNN output is a |L|-element vector, whose argmax indi-
cates the used camera model lˆk ∈ L. Note that the softmax
normalization at the end of Mcam (as proposed in [20]) is
not needed in this situation, as it only impacts the training
strategy and not the argmax we are interested in.
3.4. Reliability-Map and Camera Attribution
In order to compute the reliability map M, we aggre-
gate all gk values estimated from patches Pk, k ∈ [1,K].
This is done by generating a bidimensional matrix M with
the same size of image I, and fill in the positions covered
by the patch Pk with the corresponding gk values. In case
of overlapping patches, gk values are averaged. This map
provides pixel-wise information about image regions from
which reliable patches can be extracted. A few examples of
estimated mapsM are reported in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Examples of images I (left) and the estimated reliability
maps M (right). Patch reliability is not always strictly linked to
the image semantic content. Green areas represent high gk values,
thus reliable regions.
Finally, to attribute image I to a camera model, it is pos-
sible to select lk only for the most reliable patch (i.e., high-
est gk), or perform majority voting on estimated lk values
belonging only to reliable regions, i.e., {lk|gk > γ}, where
γ ∈ [0, 1] is the reliability threshold (set to 0.5 in this pa-
per).
4. Experimental Results
In this section we report the details about our experi-
ments. First, we describe the dataset. Then, we provide
an insight on the used training strategies.
4.1. Dataset
In this paper we evaluate our solution adapting the
dataset splitting strategy proposed in [4, 20, 22] to our prob-
lem. This strategy is tailored to the Dresden Image Dataset
[23], which consists of 73 devices belonging to 25 different
camera models. A variable number of shots are taken with
each device. Different motives are shot from each position.
We refer to a scene as combination of geographical posi-
tion with a specific motive. With this definition in mind, the
dataset consists of a total of 83 scenes. Since we are trying
to classify image patches at the level of camera model rather
than instance level, we only consider camera models with
more than one instance available. This leads us to a total of
18 camera models (as Nikon D70 and D70s basically differ
only in their on-device screen) and nearly 15 000 shots.
In order to evaluate our method we divide the dataset
consisting of 18 camera models into 3 sets, namely training
DT, validation DV and evaluation DE. DT is again split into
two equal sets DcamT and DipT . DcamT is used for training the
parameters ofMcam, whereas DipT is used for trainingMip.
DV is used to decide how many epochs to use during train-
ing to avoid overfitting. Finally, DE is used for evaluating
the trained network on a disjoint set of images in a fair way.
While training a CNN, it is very important to avoid over-
fitting the data. In our dataset we have images of different
scenes taken by different cameras, and our goal is to learn
information about camera model from an image. As DV
is used to avoid overfitting, it is important that DT and DV
are sufficiently different from each other. It is also impor-
tant that we test on data that has variation with respect to
the training data. In order to achieve these goals, we do the
following:
• Images for DE are selected from a single instance per
camera and a set of 11 scenes.
• Images for DT are selected from the additional camera
instances and 63 different scenes.
• Images in DV are selected from the same camera in-
stances used forDT, but from the remaining 10 scenes.
This makes sets DV and DT disjoint with respect to
scenes, leading to robust training.
For training, validation and testing K = 300 non over-
lapping color patches of size 64 × 64 are extracted from
each image. the resulting dataset DcamT contains more than
500 000 patches split into 18 classes. DipT is reduced to
90 000 patches to balance reliable and non-reliable im-
age patches according to Mcam classification results. Fi-
nally, DV and DE are composed by more than 700 000 and
800 000 patches, respectively.
4.2. Training Strategies
Given that the proposed approach builds upon a pre-
trained network (i.e.,Mcam), we propose a two-tiered trans-
fer learning-based approach denoted as Transfer. For the
sake of comparison, we also test two additional strategies,
namely Scratch and Pre-Trained. In the following we report
details about each strategy.
Scratch. This training strategy is the most simple one.
It consists in training the whole two-class architecture M
using only DipT for training and DV for validation. This can
be considered as a baseline training strategy. We use Adam
optimizer with default parameters as suggested in [31] and
batch size 128. Loss is set to binary-crossentropy.
Pre-Trained. This strategy takes advantage of the pos-
sibility of using a pre-trainedMcam. In this case, we train
Mcam for camera model attribution using softmax normal-
ization on its output. Training is carried out on DcamT and
validation on DV. OnceMcam has been trained, we freeze
its weights, and train the rest of the architecture Mip as a
two-class classifier (i.e., reliable vs. non-reliable patches)
using DipT and DV. Optimization during both training steps
is carried out using Adam optimizer with default values and
batches of 128 patches. We select categorical-crossentropy
as our loss function.
Transfer. This two-tiered training strategy is meant to
fully exploit the transfer learning capability of the proposed
architecture. The first step consists in training Mcam for
camera model attribution using softmax normalization on
its output andDcamT andDV as datasets. This training step is
optimized using Adam with default parameters, 128 patches
per batch, and categorical-crossentropy as loss function.
The second step of M training consists in freezing all
the convolutional layers of Mcam, and continue training
all the inner product layers of both Mcam and Mip using
the datasets DipT and DV. This enables to jointly learn the
weights of the classifier Mip, and tailor feature extraction
procedure in the last layers ofMcam (i.e., ip1 and ip2) to the
classification task. For this step we use binary-crossentropy
as loss, and stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with oscillat-
ing learning rate between 5·10−5 and 15·10−5 as optimizer.
This choice is motivated by preliminary studies carried out
in [32], and experimentally confirmed in our analysis.
5. Discussion
In this section we discuss the experimental results. First
we show the capability of the proposed approach to distin-
guish between patches that contain camera model informa-
tion and patches that are not suitable for this task. Then, we
show how it is possible to improve camera model identifi-
cation using the proposed approach.
5.1. Patch Reliability
In order to validate the patch reliability estimation we
perform a set of tests.
CNN Architecture. The first set of experiments has
been devoted to the choice of a network architecture for
Mip. To this purpose, we trained a set of different archi-
tectures for 15 epochs using the Pre-Trained strategy. As
architectures we selected all possible combinations of up to
six inner product layers (with ReLU activation) composed
by 32, 64 or 128 neurons each. The last layer is always set
to two neurons followed by softmax. From this experiment,
we selected the modelMip with the highest validation ac-
curacy for each tested amount of layers, which are:
• M2ip composed by two inner product layers with 128
and 2 neurons, respectively.
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Figure 5. Loss and accuracy curves on training (DipT ) and validation
(DV) datasets using Pre-Trained and Transfer strategies on M4ip.
• M3ip composed by three inner product layers with 64,
128 and 2 neurons, respectively.
• M4ip composed by four inner product layers with 64,
32, 128 and 2 neurons, respectively.
• M5ip composed by five inner product layers with 64,
32, 64, 128 and 2 neurons, respectively.
• M6ip composed by six inner product layers with 64, 32,
32, 64, 64 and 2 neurons, respectively.
Training Strategy. In order to validate the proposed
two-tiered Transfer training strategy, we trained the five se-
lected models with the Scratch, Pre-Trained and Transfer
strategies. Examples of training (on DipT ) and validation (on
DV) loss curves for the Pre-Trained and Transfer strategies
onM4ip are shown in Figure 5(a). It is possible to notice that
the chosen optimizers enable a smooth loss decrease over
several epochs. Moreover, the Transfer strategy provides a
lower loss on both training and validation data, thus yield-
ing better results compared to Pre-Trained. Similar conclu-
sions can be drawn from the accuracy curves presented in
Figure 5(b). We do not display curves for the Scratch strat-
egy, as it is always worse than both the Pre-Trained and
Transfer strategies. This was expected, as the amount of
used training data in DipT is probably not enough to learn
all parameters ofM. Therefore, starting from a pre-trained
Mcam becomes necessary.
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Figure 6. Patch reliability estimation accuracy. The Transfer strat-
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Figure 7. ROC curves on reliable patch detection. The proposed
methods are represented by means of solid lines. Other baselines
are dotted or dashed. Our Transfer strategy achieves the best over-
all performance.
Figure 6 shows the reliability patch estimation accuracy
for all models fromM2ip toM6ip, trained with all three train-
ing strategies and tested on the evaluation dataset DE. For
each architecture, we selected the model with highest val-
idation accuracy achieved over 100 epochs. These results
further confirm that the Scratch strategy is not a viable so-
lution for this problem. The Transfer strategy is the best
choice for each network, achieving around 86% accuracy
in detecting reliable patches. In other words, 86% of the
selected patches will be correctly attributed to their camera,
whereas only 14% of them will be wrongly classified. In the
ideal scenario of errors uniformly spread across all models
and images, this means we could use a majority voting strat-
egy to further increase accuracy at the image level.
From Figure 6, it is also possible to notice that increasing
Mip depth does not increase accuracy. Therefore, from this
point on, we only consider architectureM4ip as a good trade-
off.
Baselines Comparison. In order to further validate the
proposed approach, we also considered two possible base-
line solutions.
The first one consists in using other kinds of super-
vised classifiers exploiting the 18-element vector returned
byMcam as feature. To this purpose, we trained a logistic
Table 1. Camera model attribution accuracy using selected reli-
able patches from test dataset only. Using Transfer strategy (bold),
the amount of selected patches in DE is always greater than 77%
of |DE|. Accuracy improvement over random patch selection is
greater than 8%.
Mip Strategy Patches Accuracy Acc. Delta
Scratch 553 475 0.9009 0.0342
M2ip Pre-Trained 618 958 0.9478 0.0811
Transfer 637 135 0.9513 0.0845
Scratch 518 228 0.9041 0.0374
M3ip Pre-Trained 626 767 0.9520 0.0853
Transfer 641 808 0.9556 0.0888
Scratch 562 897 0.8963 0.0296
M4ip Pre-Trained 649 515 0.9499 0.0832
Transfer 647 998 0.9532 0.0865
Scratch 511 425 0.9045 0.0378
M5ip Pre-Trained 648 665 0.9529 0.0862
Transfer 651 508 0.9530 0.0863
Scratch 517 386 0.9035 0.0367
M6ip Pre-Trained 651 405 0.9501 0.0834
Transfer 652 308 0.9531 0.0864
regressor (Logistic), a decision tree (Tree), a random forest
(Forest) and a gradient boosting classifier (Boosting). For
each method, we applied z-score feature normalization and
we selected the model achieving highest validation accu-
racy on DV after a parameter grid-search training on DipT .
Accuracy results on patch reliability on evaluation set DE
were 70.7%, 73.9%, 78.6% and 81.8%, respectively. None
of them approaches the 86% of the proposed solution.
The second baseline solution we tested is the quality-
function presented in [22] (Quality-Function). This func-
tion is computed for each patch and returns a value be-
tween zero and one indicating whether the patch is suit-
able for training Mcam. Although Quality-Function was
not intended to work as test reliability indicator, we decided
that a comparison was necessary for completeness. To this
purpose, Figure 7 shows receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curves obtained thresholding our reliability likeli-
hood estimation gk, the soft output of the other classifiers
(i.e., logistic regressor, decision tree, etc.), and the quality-
function returned value [22]. As expected, the use of the
quality-function presented in [22] provides less accurate re-
sults. Conversely, the proposed method achieves better per-
formance than all other classifiers when trained according
to Transfer strategy.
5.2. Camera Model Attribution
After validating the possibility of selecting reliable
patches with the proposed method, we tested the effect of
this solution on camera model attribution. To this purpose,
we report in Table 1 the evaluation set results for the five
investigated Mip models and the three training strategies
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Figure 8. Camera model attribution confusion matrix obtained
with Mcam on DE without patch selection.
when a single patch is used for camera model attribution.
We do so in terms of:
1. Patches, i.e., the number of estimated reliable patches.
2. Accuracy, i.e., the average achieved camera model at-
tribution result.
3. Accuracy Delta, i.e., the accuracy increment with re-
spect to not using patch selection but randomly picking
them (i.e., [20]).
These results highlight that it is possible to improve camera
model attribution by more than 8%.
Figure 8 shows confusion matrix results using Mcam
(i.e., the output of the network proposed in [20]) on eval-
uation data DE randomly selecting patches. The average
accuracy per patch is 87%. Figure 9 shows the same results,
evaluating only patches considered reliable using M4ip. In
this scenario, accuracy increases to more than 95%. By
comparing the two figures, it is possible to notice that many
spurious classifications outside of the confusion matrix di-
agonal are corrected by the use of reliable patches only.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we presented a method for reliability patch
estimation for camera model attribution. This means being
able to estimate the likelihood that an image patch will be
correctly attributed to the camera model used to acquire the
image from which the patch comes from.
The proposed solution is based on concatenating a pre-
trained CNN for patch-wise camera model attribution with
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Figure 9. Camera model attribution confusion matrix obtained
with Mcam on DE using patches selected with M4ip.
a dense network that acts as a binary classifier. Exploit-
ing transfer learning techniques and a two-tiered training
strategy, it is possible to achieve 86% of accuracy in patch
reliability estimation. Moreover, by running camera model
attribution on single selected patches, camera attribution ac-
curacy increases by more than 8%.
In addition to the impact on camera model attribution,
the proposed method returns a reliability mask that high-
lights which image regions are considered reliable in terms
of camera attribution. This could be useful in the future to
better understand which image details are more important
to camera model attribution CNNs. Moreover, it could be
paired with splicing localization algorithms based on cam-
era model traces to possibly opt-out unreliable regions from
the analysis.
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